Judeo-Christian Teaching on Euthanasia: Definitions, Distinctions and Decisions by Smith, William B. & Grant, Edward R.
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 54 | Number 1 Article 7
February 1987
Judeo-Christian Teaching on Euthanasia:
Definitions, Distinctions and Decisions
William B. Smith
Edward R. Grant
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Smith, William B. and Grant, Edward R. (1987) "Judeo-Christian Teaching on Euthanasia: Definitions, Distinctions and Decisions,"
The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 54 : No. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol54/iss1/7
Judeo-Christian Teaching on Euthanasia: 
Definitions, Distinctions and Decisions 
Msgr. WiJliam B. Smith, S.T.D. 
This talk was given as the third annual Terence Cardinal Cooke lecture 
on Oct. 15, 1986 in New York. Monsignor Smith is dean and professor of 
moral theology at St . Joseph's Seminary , Dun woodie, Yonkers, New 
York. He is also a member of Lin acre Quarterly's editorial advisory board. 
The designation "Judeo-Christian teaching" in the title is chosen 
deliberately. While the bulk of official and scholarly documentation in this 
statement will be explicitly Catholic, I would like to make the initial point 
that the core teaching- and its continuity- here presented , is not 
narrowly singular, much less peculiar, to the Catholic tradition. What is 
here presented is, I submit, in accord with the broad spectrum of 
Protestant Christianityl and also in accord with Orthodox Judaism.2 
Further, the basic definitions and distinctions here presented, are in 
basic accord with the stated ethics and policy statements of the "Judicial 
Council" of the American Medical Association as approved by its House 
of Delegates (in Anaheim, CA, Dec. 4, 1973)3 and as revised and published 
as "# 2. 11 Terminal IlIiness" In the Current Opinions of the Judicial 
Council of the AMA. (1981) .4 
I , 
The first definition is also a distinction that will and has proved useful, 
not only in the context of death and dying, but to medical practice in 
general. 
This is the distinction between ORDINARY and EXTRAORDINARY 
means. This distinction has a long history both in medicine and ethics: it is 
over 400 years old. s And while there is almost complete agreement in the 
application of these terms in medicine and in morals , there can be some 
nuanced differences because the presuppositions of its moral use can be 
wider than those of its medical use . 
In medicine, some narrow the acceptance of these terms in relation to 
science only. Thus, "ordinary means" connote means which are regarded 
as "customary", "standard", "orthodox", and "tested", procedures in 
relation to medical science as it now is . "Extraordinary means" would con-
note the "unusual", "heroic", "orthodox", "unproved" or "experimental" 
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procedures which are incompletely established or simply unestablished , 
again in relation to medical science as it now is. Thus, many of today's 
"ordinary means" were yesterday's "extraordinary means" not because 
morals are changing, but because science is progressing. 
Morally, ORDINARY and EXTRAORDINARY means are calculated 
ethically- not in relation only to science as such-but in relation to the 
patient's actual conditions and factual circumstances, some of which 
would not be strictly medical or scientific. 
Thus, in concise form, the cluster of relevant criteria can be stated: all 
medicines , procedures, treatments and operations which: (I) offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit to this patient , (2) without serious danger of 
death , and (3) without excessive burden , pain, hardship, even subjective 
repugnance. 
Defining 'Ordinary' and 'Extraordinary' 
If a particular procedure , treatment or operation does offer an 
individual patient a reasonable hope of benefit without serious danger or 
excessive burdens , then that treatment is for that patient an ORDINARY 
means in his / her circumstances. 
If, on the other hand, a particular treatment offers a particular patient 
no reasonable hope of benefit , or does involve serious danger of death, or 
only a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, then that is an 
EXTRAORDINARY means for that patient in his / her circumstances. 
Traditionally, all are considered bound to use "ordinary means" to 
preserve their life, health and bodily integrity. (Failure to do so would 
ethically be suicidal.) Usually, one is not bound to use "extraordinary 
means" for same, but is free to do so if one so chooses. In short, "ordinary 
means" an; considered obligator.!'; "extraordinary" are optional. 
This, of course, is a statement of general principle(s) which requires 
refinement and concrete exemplification to clarify its extension and 
comprehension. While the terms are widely received in porxular discourse , 
their timeless repetition is not always accompanied by timely 
understanding. 
While the ordinary / extraordinary distinction is very old, much of its 
present precision is attributed to the formal and extensive teaching of the 
late Pope Pius XI L in particular his add ress. covering this subject. of Nov . 
24, 19576 The same principles are presently encapsulated in two sentences 
in Directive #28 of The Ethical and Religious . Directil'es.f(JI" Catholic 
Health Facilities of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. which 
reads: 
Euthanasia ("mercy killing") in a ll its form s is fo rbidd en. The failure to suppl\' th e 
ordinary mea ns of preserving life is C4ui\'alent to eu thanasia. Howe\·cr. neither 
the ph ysician nor the patient is obliged to use extraordinary means.-
Further. in a recent and formal doctrinal instruction. the Vat ican 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued a "Declaration on 
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Euthanasia" on May 5, 1980, which confirms and clarifies the same 
teaching. 8 
While some of the above statements have the advantage of being 
concise, and , therefore, apparently clear, their rationale and ref\nement 
deserve some close attention if they are to serve as more thaj1 mere 
rhetorical points of reference. 
I-a) Rationale. The rationale and basis for the ordinary / extraordinary 
distinction in Catholic teaching is meant to reflect the difference between a 
negative prohibition which is tightly circumscribed, and , a positive 
admonition which can't be circumscribed in general , but only in concrete 
particulars. 
The received teaching understands the 5th Commandment, ("Thou 
shalt not kill! Ex. 20: I 3; Mil. 19: 18) in both positive and negative terms.9 
The negative prohibition~in exceptionless form~proscribes and means 
never directly take the life of an innocent or helpless person. Positively, the 
same commandment proscribes an obligation to take care of our life, 
health and bodily integrity, which positive duty is to be fulfilled 
affirmatively within reasonable and proportionate limits. For this reason , 
"ordinary" means are said to be obligatory, and "extraordinary" means are 
optional. 
I-b) Within the notion of ORDINARY means, it is now necessary to 
make some mention of MINIMAL means. "Minimal means" are always 
presumed to be "ordinary" while allowing that their mechanical delivery , 
in unusual circumstances might, by exception, qualify as "extraordinary" 
means . 
"Minimal" means could be defined as basic hygiene and supportive 
measures , namely food , water, bed rest, room temperature and personal 
hygiene. We owe these measures of support to other human beings simply 
because they are human beings. In pediatric cases , where the patient 
cannot, by definition, be self-supporting, one can consider normal feeding, 
blood , oxygen , clearing air passages, supplying warmtp as "minimal" and 
mandatory means. Neglect of these would , in fact, be destructive. 
I-c) Some have recently and mistakenly converted this ordinary / extra-
ordinary distinction into a proportionate / disproportionate calculus. 
Indeed , no less than a Presidential Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research proposes 
this substitution. 10 Now, while it is certainly the right and privilege of a 
Presidential Commission to make recommendations about which ··1 
distinctions are or are not any longer useful in the "formulation 'Of public 
policy,"11 I find it somewhat droll that the same federal commission would 
take it upon itself to reformulate Vatican teaching on behalf of the 
Vatican. 12 (I suspect that that Commission's ethical over-reach was due 
not to lack of interest, but to its own over-reliance on one of its 
acknowledged consultants-=J~ J. Paris, S.J .~whose somewhat confused 
grasp of received Catholic teaching may well have confused the 
Commission.) 13 
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I-d) Rather than re-interpret what the 1980 "Decla ration On Euthanasia" 
allegedly "subst itutes", it would be better to see what it actually does say 
and propose as clarification (rather than substitution) in the ordinary / extra-
ordinary distinction: 
It will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means hy studying the l iP" 
of lrealmel1f used. it s degree of comp/exilr or risk. its C(lSI and the IJOssihi/ili"s of 
using it. and comparing th ese e lemen ts with the result that ca n he expected. 
tak i ng into accoun t the s{{lle of t he sick IJl'rSOIl and h is o r her ,,"rsica/ a nd II/(J/"{// 
reso urces." (Emphasis added) 
This statement , with others. of clar ifying cons id erat ions is immediately 
followed by four kinds of general cases which underline the non-obligatory 
(thUS ethically optional) nature of extraordinary means. 
- Where other remedies do not suffice. it is permissible. with the patient's 
consent, to employ the most advanced techniques . even those which are 
experimental and not without certain risk. 
- Likewise it is permissible to interrupt these same means where results 
fall short of expectations in accord with the reasonable wishes of the 
patient , the patient's family and the advice of physicians especially 
competent in the matter. 
- It is also permissible to make do with the normal means medicine can 
offer for "one cannot impose on anyone the obligation to have recourse to 
an available technique which involves a real danger or is burdensome ." 
Such a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide but should be considered an 
acceptance of the human condition. 
- Lastly, when death is imminent. one can refuse forms of treatment 
which would secure only a precarious and burdensome prolongation of 
life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person. in similar cases. is not 
interrupted. 15 
I n all of the above. the designation ordinary / extraordinary is predicated 
of the means. NOT of the Ii/e of the patient. Clearly. if a patient's life can be 
described as "extraordinary". then any and all means .-!even the most 
minimal means - could be described as extraordinary to that patient . . 
which effective ly finesses the question and the careful judgment of the 
factual circumstances of the individual case. 
Easy to Slide into Judgments 
It is all too easy today to slide or to jump into facile. even popular. 
"quality of life" judgments while pretending not to pass or make a 
judgment at all. Again. the proper judgment focuses on the extraordinari -
ness of the means. not on some allegedly extraordinary Ii/e. 
Of course. such factors as expectation of success or degree of comfort in 
surviva l do pertain to and focus on qualities of the patient's life. However. 
a now widespread a nd. in some places. a legal term such as "recovery to 
cognitive and sapient life" is a different kind of"qua lit y-of- li fe"judgment. 
It serves now as a code word and deserves to be unpacked. 
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"Recovery" is an unspecified promise word! Recovery to what degree? 
To what extent? What of those persons for whom there is no recovery? 
Some are born with physical or mental disabilities from which there is no 
recovery. 
"Cognitive and sapient life." These terms have been bouncing around 
the euthanasia movement for the past 80 years . Both are accordion 
words- either can mean as much or as little as one chooses to assign to it. 
One may judge from what I say here that I am not all that "cognitive", 
which might make me wonder whether this audience is all that "sapient." 
These are not accurate diagnostic ratings of pathologies but only scientific-
sounding value judgments some people make about other people. 
The same slippery and careless kind of value judgment is buried in 
another popular slogan - "meaningful life"! Meaningful to whom? To 
you? To me? To the editorial board of a favorite newspaper? Whoever 
makes this kind of quality-of-life kind 0'£ judgment will not be on the 
receiving end of such a judgment and , whatever degrees of "meaningful-
ness" are assigned to another person's life , we should not forget that that 
life is the only life that person has. 
I-e) A patient may live a long time with a so-called "hopeless disease", 
so , a particular means may be useless in curing a disease, but useful in 
prolonging or supporting life. The fact that it will not cure the disease does 
not change the positive duty we have to use means which support or 
preserve life. If a means will prolong life and is not too burdensome, that is, 
I think, an ordinary means. One cannot simply argue that the disease is 
incurable and , by that fact alone, no obligation exists to preserve or 
support life. The presumption underlying the opposite conclusion does 
rest on a porous quality-of-life decision , i.e., if one's life does not or will not 
meet a certain standard , it is not considered worth living or preserving or 
supporting. 
I-f) The 1980 "Declaration On Euthanasia" and prior statements as well, 
outline principles which refer to burden and benefit , or use . If a treatment 
is not burdensome and would be beneficial , it is constdered "ordinary", 
and a duty to use it. In conventional ethics, preserving or supporting life is 
considered a benefit. Burden here, of course, refers to a burden suffered or 
carried by the patient, not whether this ordinary support is a burden on the 
community, or a burden on third-party payers, or a burden to visit such a 
patient on alternate Wednesdays. 
I-g) Traditionally, the ordinary / extraordinary distinction is not limited 
to terminal cases. It can bear on cases of radical amputation or 
hemodialysis which can prolong life indefinitely. In these cases, the 
decisive focus may not be whether it benefits the patient-for clearly it 
does-but whether or how excessive a burden an individual patient can 
carry. 
Father John Connery, S.J ., is , I think, correct in preferring to keep 
separate the benefit / burden analysis in that they can be different issues 
often applying to different cases. The question of benefit looms larger in 
February, 1987 31 
terminal cases, burden looms larger in non-terminal cases, and while there 
can be reasons to separate them it is not objectionable to combine them. 16 
Also, there can as well be significant differences in terminal and non-
terminal cases. Often when death is imminent (in moral terms "imminent" 
is measured in hours and days. not in captions of six months or one year to 
live). in a terminal case. nothing reasonable can be done whatever we 
choose. whereas. at life'~ beginnings, many reasonable things can be done 
but some choose not to do them. 
In summary here. there is no pre-coded checklist or printout which can 
determine antecedently what is or is not an ordinary or extraordinary 
means as such. apart from the minimal and most highly experimental 
means . The correct determination of the extraordinariness of extraordin-
ary means can only be made on a case by case basis in view of the factual 
and actual circumstances of that case. 17 
From this section. it will appear that I am not particularly sanguine 
about what the general statutes of civil law can establish or resolve. given 
the nature of the ordinary / extraordinary distinction. From what follows. 
it should also appear that I do not believe most recent and current 
legislative proposals are after that but are. perhaps. after something else . 
II 
A Clear and Present Danger 
Apart from the public policy question of whether or not the 
ordinary / extraordinary distinction is helpful or even useful. new 
terminology has begun to permeate public discussion, legislative 
proposals; legal decisions and the death-and-dying literature. The last is 
definitely a growth industry. 
It is common. now. to speak in terms of ACTIVE (positive) and 
PASSIVE (negative) euthanasia as ideas whose time has come. I submit 
that the time has come to examine these terms closely. I have a little 
personal rule (which is why I call it "Smith's Rule") that "All Social 
Engineering Is Preceded by Verbal Engineering!" , 
When a distinction such as the ordinary / extraordinary is well grounded 
in Western medicine. all Western religions and is. at least. compatible with 
our Anglo-American civil law tradition. I become at least curious about 
proposed changes of words. lest something else is really changing while 
appearing to be only a change in words. "All Social Engineering Is 
Preceded By Verbal Engineering." 
And so . the proposal - active and passive euthanasia . The term "active" 
connotes "commission". doing something. e.g .. delivering the deadly dose. 
a positive act which actively causes death. Most. but surely not aiL in our 
society are at present opposed to this. We might note. however. that the 
Exil society in England and the Hem/ock society in the U.S.A. are not 
opposed to active euthanasia. Indeed. their publications IX advocate 
euthanasia as a "right" and Derek Humphry's book. LeI Me Die BeFore I 
Wake serves as a how-to manual by listing at the conslusion of several 
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chapters how much of which drugs of what toxicity are needed to cause 
death in the most efficient fashion. 19 (Given the national rise in teenage 
suicide , this particular book does not deserve wide circulation.) This 
literature is euphemistically described as "self-deliverance" literature 
without benefit of mentioning just to what or to whom one's self will be 
delivered. 
However, the present danger and greatest current confusion concerns 
so-called PASSIVE (negative) euthanasia which appears in most 
legislative proposals and, increasingly, in some court decisions. 
At first , "passive" euthanasia seems to reflect the conventional 
ordinary / extraordinary distinction just mentioned , but it does not do so 
properly or completely. 
The term "passive" connotes "omission" (a withholding, a withdrawal) 
of some treatment or procedure. But the term "passive-omission" is 
inherently ambiguous until and unless it is determined what kind of means 
is being passively omitted, withheld or withdrawn. 
On the one hand , the 'passive omission of an extraordinary means is 
NOT euthanasia and should not be so called .2o But, on the other hand , the 
passive omission of an ordinary means is euthanasia and should be so 
called. 21 
A clarifying definition pertinent to this is found in the 1980 "Declaration 
On Euthanasia" which reads: 
By euthanasia is understood an action or an omission which of itself or by 
intention causes death , in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated. 
Euthanasia's terms of reference, therefore. are to be found in the intention of the 
will and in the methods used 22 
Please, this not merely quibbling over words. All sorts of legislative 
proposals and court decisions have proposed or decided a patient's alleged 
"right" to refuse or forego ALL med ical means without clarifying whether 
that refusal refuses extraordinary means (with which 1(0 one really argues 
or absolutely forbids), or refuses all ordinary means- even minimal 
means - (with which most, except for euthanatizers, really do disagree). 
For example, the celebrated Claire Conroy case in New Jersey, decided 
Jan. 17, 1985, declared no less than four times that a patient has the right 
"to decline to have am' medical treatment" (p. 21); again , "to decline 
medical treatment" (p. 22, quoting Quinlan); "to refuse medical treatment" 
(p. 30); and finally "the right to decline any medical treatment, including 
artificial feeding" (p. 62) . Over and over, the alleged "right" to decline or 
refuse ANY treatment without clarifying or specifying "I'hat kind of 
treatment is being declined or refused. 23 
Another example is the sad and troubled Bouvia case in California 
which established the "right" to refuse ANY and ALL treatment on our 
Pacific coast. Having first won the legal right not to be fed , Ms. Bouvia 
next secured a court order to determine her morphine leveJ.24 Is this 
medicine? Or, is the physician now the equivalent of a maItre d' who simply 
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presents a medical menu and takes orders regardless of what the patient 
(customer) orders or refuses? 
It is this unqualified canonization of the passive omission of ANY and 
ALL treatment that presents a clear and present danger to our public 
policy and to the ethics of the med ical profession. There is no way that this 
trend can be confined to the death-and-dying context where death is 
imminent; it has already been moved to and applied to the chronically 
ill - those patients who are not getting any better nor getting any worse. (It 
is already selectively applied in pediatric cases; e.g., Indiana's Baby Doe 
case.) 
If minimal means-food , water, bed rest , room temperature, personal 
hygiene- can be passively omitted from this class of persons, that is no 
mere neutral omission, but a lethal omission which causes death; it kills . 
When a competent patient's ability to request same is compromised and 
this decision is delegated to a surrogate, to substituted judgment, or to 
committees of or for that person, the number of players may become 
larger, but the outcome is no more secure ethically. 
Already, on March 15, 1986, meeting in New Orleans , a seven person 
committee of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American 
Medical Association, reported out favorably this recommendation: 
it is not unethical to discontinue all m ea ns of life-prolonging medica l 
treatment ... for a patien t in irreversi ble coma when death is imminent: and even 
if death is not imminent .. 25 
It seems to me , that the small addition of the last clause, "even if death is 
not imminent", represents a small step back for man but a giant step 
backwards for mankind . I do not use the term "mankind" in a sexist sense, 
but rather I use it to emphasize that such a step is not "kind" to man nor 
woman, for it means we do not treat some as our kind anymore. 
Allowing to die, by foregoing extraordinary means , is choos ing to live 
even when dying. But the omission of ordinary-especially minimal -
means is no mere omission. but a lethal omission. The 198<J "Declaration 
on Euthanasia" addresses this very point. that it is permitted: 
to refuse forms of treatment that wou ld only secu re a precarious and 
burdensome pro lo ngation of life. so long as the norma/ care due to the sick person 
in similar cases is /lOI il7lerruflled." (Emphasis added) 
Pope John Paul II has tirelessly repeated this last qualification - on Oct. 
2 L 1985. addressing two working groups of the Pontifical Academy of 
SciencesY and again. on Nov. 15. 1985. to a Conference on "Pre-
Leukaemia" with an important reason stated: 
34 
The principle ... while it discourages from employment of purely expe rimen tal or 
co mplete ly ineffectual ope ration s. does not dispense from the valid therapeutic 
task of sustaining life nor from the administration of the /lonl/a/mean" of \'ila/ 
S li/ '/}() r/ , Science. e,'en when it is unable to heal. can and should care for and assist 
t he sic k, " 
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Thus, we might offer as a principle: Even when there is no cure, there 
remains the obligation of human care- that care and assistance which 
include normal means of vital support. 
To expand the "when-death-is-not-imminent" net can, in our society, be 
a very extensive net indeed, not only to the irreversibly comatose, but also 
to what one journal calls those "biologically tenacious individ uals"; then to 
the chronically sick whose "cognitive" functions are lowered, lessened or 
hardly recordable. Some persons experience such things post trauma; 
others are born that way. If the most ordinary, even minimal , means of 
medical maintenance or support are passively omitted , passively 
withdrawn, or passively withheld from these persons, we have, I submit, 
not just a new development of words , but a new and transformed medical 
ethic. 
III 
Problem: Suggested Source and Suggested Cure 
A legal litany of court cases is , by now, familiar: Quinlan (NJ); 
Saikewicz (MA); Perlmutter (FL); Fox / Storar (NY); Severns (DE); 
Brophy (MA); Herbert (CA); Barber (CA); Bouvia (CA). Traffic is very 
heavy in California, as are some heavy precedents. 
Curiously, in this age of deregulation, California is the state with the 
most laws and regulations about death and dying. California was the first 
to pass a so-called "Natural Death Act" (1976); next, it added a "Durable 
Power of Attorney" law, and now is considering a third law on "Advanced 
Directives." Yet this state with the most laws, whose presenting reasons 
were to "cliHify", is the state with the most court cases then and now. 
Perhaps this only proves that no law is litigation-proof and no law is 
interpretation-proof. 
As suggested above , I do not think that positive statutes can resolve 
antecedently complicated judgments re ordinary / extraordinary, but 
poorly drafted statutes will certainly complicate matlfrs further. There is 
an axiom in both logic and in law that a negative prohibition binds semper 
et pro semper, i.e., it is always in effect and covers all cases , whereas a 
positive law binds semper sed non pro semper, i.e., it too is always in effect 
but can't touch all cases . 
Thus, for example, a negative law forbidding auto theft is simple 
enough; negatively, it forbids the taking (against the reasonable will of the 
owner) of any and every car, old or new, stretch size or sub-compacts. 
However a positive law- to pay just taxes- is always in place, but to spell 
that out positively in all possible circumstances is no small effort. Witness 
the recent overhaul of our federal tax code (what it applies to, what not). 
No informed person could possibly suggest that they would or could sum 
up that positive tax law in a sentence or two, a talk or two, an audit or two. 
Accuracy there depends on a mountain of factual, actual circumstances, 
along with a deep valley of possible exceptions. 
So too, in the medical-moral decisions re ordinary / extraordinary 
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means. We already have a law that says physicians cannot kill those they 
cannot cure- part of the homicide statutes. But, on the other hand, there is 
no law that says a patient or physician must use ALL means on ALL 
patients at ALL times regardless of hardship, burden or grave 
inconvenience. Such a law would not only be futile but stupid; one might 
just as well pass a law against mortality. The fact is , people do die- and we 
will, too- whether or nqt we have accumulated the requisite amount of 
certified credits in a death and dying course. 
The legislative dificulty is not, as I see it, in the extreme: do 
EVERYTHING or do NOTHING. The difficulty is the vast in-between. 
How can a positive statute possibly foresee antecedently all the actual 
medical factors and relevant health circumstances and possible 
complications of just the people in this audience? And it is the actual 
assessment of factual and personal circumstances which is crucial to the 
determination of the extraordinariness of extraordinary means in any 
given factual case. 
My legal friends tell me that "hard cases make bad law", and I suspect 
that "really hard cases make really bad law". It is my personal opinion that 
you can't legislate hard cases out of existence. My respect for ourjust civil 
laws is profound and sincere. Indeed, as a form of regulating human 
conduct in a way consistent with human dignity, just civil laws are light 
years ahead of whatever is in second place . 
Question of Trust 
But one problem which is not discussed very much in the rush to litigate 
and legislate is the question of trust. I suspect that you can't legislate trust, 
either, just as I suspect and know that the core element in the physician-
patient relationship is the basis in trust and the virtue of trust. Medicine, 
like any learned profession, rests on and needs a relationship of trust. 
which is why that profession, and others, require a professional oath and 
code of ethics. 
My suggestion here is that this is the root problem: oJr society and 
public policy are making and changing the professional oath and ethics of 
the medical profession. The past decade (1976-1986) of legislative activity, 
so-called Living Wills, Natural Death Acts, Durable Powers of Attorney, 
Advance Directives. etc .. have all advanced under the banner of 
unqualified patient autonomy to the extent that the zenith of unqualified 
autonomy has been reached and one of the core components of traditional 
medical ethics has been reversed. ~9 
If the most recent Bouvia decision becomes the societal trend then the 
new medical ethic turns on WHO is to CHOOSE rather than WHAT is 
CH OS EN. Proced ural mechanisms are so designed to ensure "free choice" 
that they offer no coherent guidance for judging the relative goodness of 
that choice. 
Unqualified autonomy mechanisms do not assist physicians to 
discharge their deepest ethical responsibility- first do no harm (primum 
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non nocere.f), nor their duty to formulate individualized treatment 
recommendations based on a medically informed understanding of the 
patient's good. 30 
In the new ethic, patient choice (a utonomy) is more important than best 
interest (beneficence). This is the complete triumph of procedural ethics 
(mechanisms and modalities of consent) over substantive ethics (the oath 
and promise first- to do no harm). The newly committed physician is 
reduced to a committed facilitator, committed to carrying out patient 
preferences regardless of the outcome of that preferential choice. Unless 
corrected, not simply by stepping off the case , this is a danger not only to 
physicians but to the medical community as an organized profession, 
committed by oath to a known ethic. 
Consider the question of suicide. No jurisdiction in these United States 
penalizes suicide as a crime. If one succeeds, the case is moot ; if one fails in 
the attempt, we consider that a cry for help needing counseling, not 
incarceration. Yet, in most jurisdictions, it is a crime to assist a suicide. 
Consider next the concluding sections of most of the so-called Living-
Will legislation . Almost all conclude with cautions and disclaimers: that 
this new law has no civil nor criminal liability consequences re suicide; no 
insurance consequences re suicide; no professional peer rebuke 
consequences re suicide. In net result , such laws and similar court 
decisions, especially those procla iming a "right" to refuse ANY and ALL 
means, including the most minimal means , simply de-criminalize and 
de-fang all the possible penalties or consequences of assisting a suicide. 
Thus, in effect, we simply de-criminalize and detoxify the anti-assisted 
suicide stafutes without even debating the merits or demerits of the crime 
of assisting a suicide. 
A certain recognizable sequence emerges: 
(I) it is not unethical to remove all support: 
(2) a helprul court or legislature declares this a new "right": 
(3) it becomes unconst itutiona l to interrere with the ex~ rc i se or thi s new 
"right": 
(4) a move on the rederal treasury or Medicare to insure that poor peop le ha ve 
the same access to thi s new "right" as the rich do: 
(5) then we ha ve no more laws against assisting a suicide and physicians who 
decline to racilitate such choices will be branded "sectarian". "divisive" 
and. no doubt . guilty ortrying to "impose their va lues" on poor sick people 
who are only trying to exercise their new "rights" . 
There are precedents for this sequence in our society. 
If the suggestion is correct as to the problem-a changed and new 
medical ethic- then the suggested resolution and cure will be found not in 
legislation, but in a resolution of ethics . 
The medical profession , like all professions in our society, has suffered 
the same reductionist pressure , i.e ., reducing the oath and ethic of the 
profession simply to the promise not to do anything illegal! Obviously, 
that promise has a built-in drain . One promises to change or adjust one's 
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ethics with every change or adjustment in law. Compound that with the 
triumph of procedural ethics over substantive ethics, and the physician-
patient relationship is turned pretty much inside-out. 
Crucial Adherence to Oath 
It is particularly the area of euthanasia where adherence to the 
professional oath is crucial. A scalpel can either cure or kill; as can drugs. 
These substances are blind as to their purpose and results, but the hand 
that guides cannot be blind. Historically, one motivational source for 
physician's practice came from the profession'S solidarity regarding the 
high value of human life, of health and of compassionate therapeutic 
intervention. In the euthanasia field , we need not invent the future; we 
need only remember the past! 
In this century, we have learned in horrifying detail what does happen 
when the ethics of medicine changes or collapses or fails to speak up; when 
the power to cure gets mixed up with the power to kill. 
Just recently, Robert Jay Lifton has published a book entitled The Nazi 
Doc/ors: Medical Killing and the Psychology 0/ Genocide. ) I It is not a nice 
book to read, nor is it the first entry in the literature of misplaced 
sovereignty. Prior to it , Dr. Frederic Wertham published , A Sign For Cain 
in 1966, Chapter 6 of which is "The Geranium in the Window: The 
Euthanasia M urders.")2 
Prior to both of these, Dr. Leo Alexander, a medical consultant at the 
Nuremberg Trials, published his famous essay "Medical Science Under 
Dictatorship.")) All three of these scholars admit that the euthanasia 
movement in Germany did not begin when the first direct order for 
euthanasia was signed by Hitler on Sept. I, 1939. Nor did it begin precisely 
at 12 noon on Jan. 30, 1933, when President Hindenburg, acting 
constitutionally, entrusted the chancellorship of Germany to Adolf Hitler. 
No. The euthanasia movement in Germany began and got first 
respectability with the publication of a book, published in ~eipzig in 1920, 
entitled Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerten Leben-(The 
Release (Permission) olthe Destruction ol Lile Unworthr ol Lile ') This 
was published not by Nazis, but by two distinguished German professors: 
the jurist. Karl Binding, doctor of jurisprudence and philosophy who 
taught for 40 years on the law faculty of the University of Leipzig, and Dr. 
Alfred H oche, professor of psychiatry at the University of Freiburg. Prof. 
Binding wrote the legal section; Dr. Hoche wrote the medical section. The 
book had some popularity because a second edition had to be printed two 
years later (1922). 
The tiny change that changed everything is right there in the title, 
.. Lebensunv.·erten Leben"! ("Life not worth living!") That there is such a 
thing as a "life devoid of value"! 
Binding and Hoche wrote of "absolutely worthless human beings; those 
who have 'neither the will to live nor to die' ; those who are 'mentally 
completely dead' "34Notice, with a publication date of 1920, the concept of 
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a "life not worth living" was not a Nazi invention, but with the collapse or 
withdrawal of the medical , legal and ministerial professions , the Nazis had 
no qualms about picking up a well-prepared and field-tested idea that 
fitted so well their own maniacal purposes. 
For many of our contemporaries, their only view of pre-Hitler 
Germany, the Weimar Republic, is a splendid performance by Joel Gray in 
the broadway show, Cabaret. The moral decadence and ethical drift were 
true and were not limited to nightclub performers. A "Silent 
Secularization" preceded National Socialism in the Weimar Germany of 
the 1920s and 1930s. It was a secular insistence that man-made ethics is 
superior and should take precedence over transcendent values and over the 
moral ideals of our common Judeo-Christian heritage. 35 The "smart 
money" in the medical field felt a real need to break out of the old and tired 
doctrines of the Hippocratic Oath. 
The secular drive to first separate, then privatize all transcendent values 
and ethics in Weimar greatly facilitated the professional acceptance and 
acquiescence of that pivotal pitfall that there is such a thing as a "Iife-not-
worth-living". Dr. Alexander traces the whole euthanasia movement back 
to this single change in mind and attitude; once we change our attitude 
toward the non-rehabilitable sick, we are prepared to change everything. 
The antidote is simply stated and it is ethical: when there is no cure , we still 
provide human care! This does not require ethically optional extraordinary 
care, but it does require ordinary care and certainly those minimal means 
which are required to sustain, support and preserve any human life . 
I consider it a privilege to be a trustee of Calvary Hospital in the Bronx, 
an institution committed to patients with advanced cancer. While there is 
no cure for advanced cancer, we do provide medical a nd human care at 
that hospital. Here , at this Cardinal Cooke Health Care Center, for many, 
there is no cure, but medical and human care are provided. It's a simple 
rule, but a crucial one, and it is rooted more in ethics than anything else: 
where there is no cure, we do provide human care. , 
I do not here pretend to articulate public policy. I do not pretend to 
answer any and all legal questions. I do not pretend that there are not or 
will not be some very hard cases, but I make no pretense or apology for 
what is needed to approach any of those subjects. 
The core problem is a matter of trust and that is a matter of ethics, 
committed trust to a promised oath and ethic: first, do no harm- no active 
harm , no passive harm. That is the core commitment of the medical 
profession and must be the first commitment in the actual practice of 
medicine. 
No profession is immune to ignorance, human weakness, temptation or 
greed, and that most definitely includes my own. And that is why the 
function of a professional code and ethic is to give the professional his / her 
mark , the target for which he / she must aim. To miss chronically or to 
permit the miss to become a habit , is to institutionalize se lf-service and 
change a dedicated goal into a sophisticated cover-up- yes, even a 
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sophisticated legal cover-up. 
I know, as you do, that somO! consider it clever to be cynical, and some 
consider it enlightened to be unbelieving, and some consider it sensible to 
be prudently silent. But, the cynical, unbelieving, sensible types have been 
all too willing to put professional success ahead of true standards and to 
put cleverness ahead of real character. That will not serve real patients. It 
will not serve the i .ldividual patient however compromised , nor serve the 
medical professiolJ however litigated, nor will it serve our society however 
much some don't want to look at i'lOr value those of us who don't function 
too well or hardly at all. 
As Prof. Paul Ramsey often points out, the good that we can do will 
only be complemented and completed by the harm we refuse to do. Let the 
first principle of medical ethics be the last word: First, do no harm! Next, 
do no harm! Last, do no harm to any person of allegedly great value or 
allegedly no value. First and last, DO NO HARM! 
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